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Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 84-88 Broadway, Inc.
942 F. Supp. 225 (3rd Cir. 1996)

INTRODUCTION

Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), owner of the copyright at issue,
brought suit against 84-88 Broadway, Inc. d/b/a J.P Anthony's
("Anthony's"), operator of a nightclub business establishment, for
allegedly allowing infringing performances of copyrighted works to
be played at their premises.1 BMI requested an award of statutory
damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(1).?
On cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District
Court for New Jersey held that: (1)the sub-licensing agreement to
provide background music which contained copyrighted
compositions did not authorize Anthony's to host live or disc jockey
performances of the copyrighted compositions; (2) an issue of fact
existed as to whether the majority shareholder, John Schepisi, had the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity on Anthony's
premises; (3) a question of fact existed as to whether holding a
shareholder vicariously liable for infringement precluded summary
judgment; and (4) an issue of fact existed as to whether infringement
of copyrighted songs played at Anthony's was willful or innocent,
thus precluding summary judgment on the issue of statutory
damages.
The United States District Court for New Jersey held that the live
and disc jockey performances of compositions licensed by BMI
which were played at Anthony's infiinged upon BMI's copyrights.4
The court granted BMI's motion for summary judgment, denied
Anthony's cross-motion for summary judgment as to liability, denied
1. Broadcast Music, Inc., v. 84-88 Broadway, Inc. d/b/a J.P. Anthony's and John A.
Schepisi, 942 F. Supp. 225, 227 (3rd Cir. 1996).

2. Id. at232.
3. Id. at 225.
4. Id at226.
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BMI's motion for summary judgment against John Schepisi and
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment as to damages
and attorneys' fees and costs.'
FACTS

BMI is a performing rights society which purchases copyrighted
songs and the rights to perform these songs from the original owners.'
After BMI purchases these songs and the rights to perform them,
BMI then licenses the right to perform the songs to third parties.7 In
August 1993, Anthony's entered into a Sub-Licensing Agreement
("Agreement") with Digital Music Service ("Digital"). Digital is a
music service which provides background music to third parties for
their desired use via the "service."' Anthony's then uses the music in
whatever venue it desires. The Agreement provided, in relevant part,
that for a designated fee, Digital "shall provide subscription music
programming to Anthony's at the premises discussed."9
BMI did not issue Anthony's a license to offer such live and disc
jockey performances, nor did Anthony's obtain permission from the
copyright owners whose music was being publicly performed.' 0 In
response, Anthony's wrote to BMI on February 9, 1994, stating that
"any fees for music at J.P. Anthony's are being paid pursuant to a
licensing agreement with Digital which is presently servicing the
subject premises."'" BMI replied that the Agreement with Digital
only granted Anthony's the right to broadcast the copyrighted music
over the Digital cable system, and it did not give Anthony's the right
to host live performances or to play any compact discs or tapes of the
copyrighted music licensed by BMI.12
BMI offered to provide Anthony's with a license to host live and
5.Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 227.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 227.
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disc jockey performances of the BMI-licensed copyrighted music.13
Anthony's refused to enter into such an agreement, contending that to
do so would simply be paying BMI for music they already had the
right to play. 4 In an effort to confirm that Anthony's continued to
host such live performances, BMI sent investigators to Anthony's on
May 11 and 13, 1994."5 At Anthony's, the BMJ investigatorsobserved the performances of at least ten musical compositions
16
licensed by BMI.
After Anthony's refused to cease hosting the public performances
of the BMI-licensed works, BMI filed its first complaint for
copyright infingement on November 23, 1994. BMI alleged that, in
at least ten instances, Anthony's and its stockholder and officer John
Schepisi hosted public performances of its copyrighted musical
compositions without authorization. 7 On February 1 and 5, 1995,
subsequent to the filing of the original complaint, BMI investigators
discovered that Anthony's continued to host the public performances
of at least seventeen BMI-licensed works.' As a result, BIl filed an
amended complaint on April 25, 1995, incorporating its earlier claims
and including seventeen additional instances of alleged
infringement. 9 BMI and Anthony's cross-moved for summary
judgment on BMI's amended complaint.2"

13. Id.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 228 (citing the following songs which were alleged to have been publicly
performedatAnthony's:"DiamondGirl,""AngelintheMoming,""She'saBadMamaJara,"
"Little Help from My Friends," "We Can Work it
Out," "lyla,"'Takin' Care ofBusiness,"
"Stand," "Fields of Gold," "Midnight Blue," "Rocky Raccoon," "Let it Be," "Bad to the
Bone," "Ob-la-di Ob-la-da," "I Honestly Love You," "Only the Lonely," "Walk Like an
Egy

"'JohnnyB.
."Goo'

otYouBaE"
O

hPettyWoman: "'Good-byeYellowBrick

Road,""MeandBobbyMcGee,""JustmyagiationRunningAwaywithMe""Back iithe
USSR," "I Think I Love You," "Wonder of You," and "Rose.")
17. BroadcastMusic, Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 227
18. Id. at228.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

The primary issue presented before the court on the parties' cross
motions is whether a sub-licensing agreement entered into between
Digital and Anthony's to provide background music containing
copyrighted compositions vests Anthony's with the right to host live
or disc jockey performances of the same copyrighted compositions
licensed by BMI.21 In order to prevail on a claim of copyright
infringement in a musical composition, a plaintiff must show: (1)
originality and authorship of the composition; (2) compliance with
the formalities of the Copyright Act; 22 (3) proprietary rights in the
work involved; (4) public performance of the composition involved
for profit; and (5) lack of authorization for public performance. 3
BMI must establish each of the five elements in order to succeed on
its claim for copyright infringement.24
Anthony's and John Schepisi do not contest that BMI is able to
establish the first three elements of a copyright infringement: (1)
originality; (2) registration; and (3) propriety interest elements.25 As
Anthony's provided no evidence to the contrary, the court found that
BMI established the first two elements of copyright infringement.26
With respect to the third element, propriety interest, the court stated
that "where the plaintiff is also the author of [the] musical
compositions, the certificates are prima facie evidence of
proprietorship." 27 However, where a plaintiff, such as BMI, is not an
21. Id. at 226.
22. Id at 228 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hampton Beach Casino Ballroom Inc.,

No. 94-248, 1995 WL 803570) (holding: "Compliance with the formalities ofthe Copyright
Act" entails incorporating the names and authors and publishers of each of the subject
compositions, the date of copyright registration and the registration number. A
registration certificate establishes the originality and authorship of compositions, as
well as compliance with the formalities of the Copyright Act").
23. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 228 (citing Broadcast Music Inc. v. WPBK,
Inc., 922 F. Supp. 803, 805 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
24. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 228.

25. Id.(citing BMI v. Pine Belt Investment Developers, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 1016, 1020
(S.D. Miss. 1987).
26. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 229.
27. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/10
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author but an assignee of previously registered copyrights, "the
plaintiff must show evidence beyond the registration certificate to
show proprietary rights in the compositions.""8 Because Anthony's
and Schepisi did not challenge the evidence presented concerning
BMI's assertions regarding their proprietary interests, the court found
that BMI had proprietary rights in each of the subject compositions.29
The court found that the fourth element, public performance, was
established by the uncontroverted evidence contained in the
Licensing Infringement Reports of Joanne Lepko and the Certified
Infringement Reports of Ross Schneider.3" Ms. Lepko and Mr.
Schneider were both hired by BMI for the purpose of visiting
Anthony's and preparing written reports of musical compositions that
were publicly performed at the establishment.31 The Infringement
Reports indicated that all of the BMI-licensed compositions allegedly
performed were, in fact, performed. 2 The court explained that "it is
well settled that investigators' affidavits can constitute sufficient
proof of live public performance."33 Although Anthony's argued that
the information contained in the Infringement Reports was inaccurate
and incomplete, Anthony's presented no evidence in support of its
contention.34 According to the court, the defendants "must do no
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
material facts" in order to defend successfully against BMI's motion
for summary judgment. 5 As a result, the court held that the
undisputed evidence contained in the summary judgment record
reflected that the twenty-seven songs BMI alleged were publicly
performed at Anthony's were, in fact, publicly performed.36
In addition to proving that the songs were publicly performed, BMI
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 230.
35. Id.(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,586
(1986)).
36. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 230.
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must also demonstrate that the public performance was used for
profit.37 Although BMI did not present any evidence of profit, in the
absence of such evidence, a court may infer that Anthony's derived
some pecuniary benefit from the public performance.3 Because the
court found it only logical to assume that Anthony's hosted such
public performances in order to attract customers whose patronage
enabled Anthony's to make a profit, the court inferred that Anthony's
derived pecuniary benefit from the public performances. 9 The court
stated that "[i]f music did not pay, it would be given up."4
Lastly, in order to succeed on its copyright infringement claim,
BMI must show that Anthony's lacked proper authorization to host
the public performances of the BMI-licensed works.4 1 BMI relied on
the Declaration of Lawrence Stevens, BlII's Assistant Vice-President,
in order to satisfy this element.42 In his declaration, Mr. Stevens
stated that Anthony's did not enter into a BMI license agreement, nor
were the performances otherwise authorized.43 However, Anthony's
argued that the Agreement entered into between Digital and
Anthony's for the provision of a background music subscription
authorized both live and disc jockey performances." The court
disagreed with this reasoning and explained that a review of the
provisions of the Agreement revealed that it was merely a
subscription contract between Anthony's and Digital requiring Digital
to provide Anthony's with access to and permission to broadcast the
45
"Digital Music Service."
Although the plain language of the Agreement neither explicitly
nor implicitly vested Anthony's with the right to host live or disc
jockey performances of any of the BMI-licensed musical
compositions, the purpose of the Agreement was to clearly set forth
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.(citing Broadcast Music Inc. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531,534 (D.Me. 1987)).
BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 230..
Id.
Id. (citing Herbert v. Stanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 595 (1917)).
BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to provide its music service.46 The Agreement expressly limited the
use of Digital's services to the extent that Anthony's could not record
the music for other broadcasts, could not interrupt the programming
for commercial announcements and could not use the programming
to replace live music or could not be used as an accompaniment for
dancing, skating, or similar entertainment.47 Given these express
limitations, the court concluded that the Agreement was not intended
to allow Anthony's to host live or disc jockey performances of the
compositions contained in the Digital Music Service subscription.48
The court explained that Anthony's interpretations of this
unambiguous document "stretched the Agreement's four comers
farther than they were intended to reach."49 The court also held that
Anthony's erroneous belief that the Agreement authorized such live
and disc jockey performances, even if bona fide, did not exonerate it
from liability for copyright infiingement. 0
In BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. WPBK, Inc., the defendants contended
that a licensing agreement entered into by the owner of a jukebox
located on defendants' premises and BMI, authorizing BMI-licensed
songs to be played publicly via the jukebox, permitted the same songs
to be performed on the defendants' premises by means of any other
medium.5 The defendants further argued that they did not believe
that they needed to obtain an additional license in order to play the
BMI-licensed songs on a record machine on karaoke nights.52 The
court disagreed and found the defendants liable for copyright
infringement.53 The court reasoned that if it were to hold otherwise,
defendants would be permitted to play, without a license, any type of
recorded music, whether through a karaoke machine or by hiring a
disc jockey, so long as they played the music through the same sound
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, 3 NrMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, §13.08 at 13-280 (1996 ed.)).

51. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 250 (citing Broadcast Music Inc. v.
WPBK, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 803, 805 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)).
52. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 231.
53. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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recorded music, whether through a karaoke machine or by hiring a
disc jockey, so long as they played the music through the same sound
system which was utilized by a properly licensed machine.14 The
court found such an argument unconvincing, as defendants had failed
to support their position with any case authority. -1
As applied to this case, the court found Anthony's contention that
the Sub-Licensing Agreement granted it the authority to host live and
disc jockey performances of BMI-licensed songs equally
unconvincing and untenable. 6 The court reasoned that to hold
otherwise, any proprietor wishing to avoid the licensing fees charged
by licensing companies could simply obtain a subscription for
background music service from an intermediary such as Digital and
pay a substantially lower sum for the same rights. 7 The court
determined that such a result would be both anomalous and
inequitable.58
The Agreement between Digital and Anthony's gave Anthony's the
right to play the background music provided in the "Digital Music
Service" subscription.59 The court held that the fact that Digital's
background musical service may have contained BMI-licensed works
is legally irrelevant.' Moreover, the court reasoned that the separate
licensing of protected works by BMI for live performances did not
constitute the payment of an additional licensing fee to BMI. 6
Having concluded that the Sub-Licensing Agreement entered into
between Anthony's and Digital did not authorize the public
performance of the BMI-licensed songs, the court held that the
undisputed evidence contained in the summary judgment record
reflects that Anthony's lacked authorization for such public
performances.62
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/10
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Having held that Anthony's infringed on BM's copyrighted
material, the court determined whether the Anthony's could be held
liable for its actions.63 Although neither Anthony's nor John Schepisi
actually performed the infringing works, courts have long held that
one may be liable for copyright infringement even though he has not
performed the protected composition.' The court reasoned that
Anthony's liability for the performance of the infringing works at the
establishment stemmed from the principle that "a proprietor [is] liable
for the infringement of copyright resulting from the performance of
a musical composition by a band or orchestra whose activities
provide the proprietor with a source of customers and enhances
income.65 The proprietor is liable whether the band is considered, as
66
a technical matter, an employee or an independent contractor.1
Thus, according to the court, Anthony's is vicariously liable for the
performance of any infinging work at the establishment.67
Consequently, summary judgment was granted with respect to
liability in favor of BMI and against Anthony's.
In its decision regarding John Schepisi's liability, the court
explained that an officer of the proprietor-corporation may be liable
for the performance of the infringing activity.6 Although the
uncontroverted evidence contained in the summary judgment record
demonstrated that John Schepisi was the majority shareholder of
Anthony's and had a direct financial interest in Anthony's, BMI failed
to present the court with any evidence that Mr. Schepisi possessed the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity.6 9 For this reason,
BMI's motion for summary judgment against Mr. Schepisi was
63. Id.
64. Id.(citing Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
65. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 231.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. BroadcastMusic, Inc., 942 F. Supp. at232 (citing Warner Bros., Inc. v. Lobster
Pot,Inc., 582 F. Supp. 478,482 (ND. Ohio 1984) (citing Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Assoc., Inc., 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st Cir. 1977)).
69. BroadcastMusic Inc., 942 F. Supp. at 232.
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denied.7" Anthony's cross motion for summary judgment was also
denied.7
Having granted summary judgment regarding liability in favor of
BMI, the court next determined the relief to which BMI was
entitled.72 BMI moved for an order permanently enjoining Anthony's
from any further acts of infringement. 3 The Copyright Act empowers
a court to grant injunctions in order "to prevent or restrain
infringement of a copyright."'74 After establishing the fact that
copyright infringement occurred, the court enjoined Anthony's from
hosting future public performances of any BMI-licensed songs.75
However, the court held that Anthony's is not enjoined from
continuing to receive and broadcast the Digital Music Service
pursuant to the Sub-Licensing Agreement with Digital. 6 In addition,
the injunction did not preclude Anthony's from hosting public
performances of the BMI-licensed works without obtaining BMI's
permission.77
BMI also sought an award of statutory damages of $1000 for each
of the nine acts of copyright infringement which occurred prior to the
filing of their original complaint and $5000 for each of the eighteen
acts of infingement which it alleged were willful because those acts
occurred after the filing of their original complaint. 71 Within the
range set by section 504(c)(1), the court has discretion to grant an
award of damages to a plaintiff.79 Whether to award statutory
damages in the high or low end of the range depends largely upon
whether a defendant's infringement was "willful, knowing, or merely
innocent."80 In light of the parties' conflicting contentions regarding
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/10
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this issue, the court found that there was a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether the infringements were willful, knowing or
merely innocent, thus precluding the entry of summary judgment in
favor of BMIv with regard to statutory damages. Accordingly, BMI's
motion for summary judgment was denied as to damages."1
CONCLUSION

The United States District Court for New Jersey held that the live
and disc jockey performances played at a business establishment
which were licensed by a separate company infringed upon that
company's copyrights. Having refused to enter into a legal licensing
agreement with BMI, Anthony's decided to continue hosting live
performances. As holder of the copyrights of a number of songs
played at Anthony's, BMI was entitled to be compensated for the use
of the songs. As a result of Anthony's failure to compensate BMI for
the use of its products, the court granted summary judgment against
Anthony's as to liability and ordered injunctive relief, but denied
BMI's motion for damages and attorney's fees and costs. The court
also ordered that Anthony's be permanently enjoined from hosting
the public performance of any compositions licensed or copyrighted
by BMI.

DavidS. Kerpel

81. Id.
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